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       On a Razor’s Edge: Evaluating Arguments from Expert Opinion 
 
Argument & Computation 5(2-3), 2014, 139-159.         Douglas Walton      CRRAR 
 
This paper takes an argumentation approach to find the place of trust in a method for evaluating arguments from 
expert opinion. The method uses the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion along with its 
matching set of critical questions. It shows how to use this scheme in three formal computational argumentation 
models that provide tools to analyze and evaluate instances of argument from expert opinion. The paper uses several 
examples to illustrate the use of these tools. A conclusion of the paper is that from an argumentation point of view, it 
is better to critically question arguments from expert opinion than to accept or reject them based solely on trust. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
    This paper offers solutions to key problems of how to apply argumentation tools to analyze 
and evaluate arguments from expert opinion. It is shown (1) how to structure the argumentation 
scheme for argument from expert opinion (2) how to apply it to real cases of argument from 
expert opinion, (3) how to set up the matching set of critical questions that go along with the 
scheme, (4) how to find the place of trust in configuring the schemes and critical questions, (5) 
how to use these tools to construct an argument diagram to represent pro and con arguments in a 
given argument from expert opinion, (6) how to evaluate the arguments and critical questions 
shown in the diagram, and (7) how to use this structure within a formal computational model to 
determine whether what the expert says is acceptable or not.  
     One of the critical questions raises the issue of trust, and a central problem is to determine 
how the other critical questions fit with this one. The paper studies how trust is related to 
argument from expert opinion in formal computational argumentation models. 
    Section 2 poses the problem to be solved by framing it within the growing and now very large 
literature on trusting experts. It is shown that there can be differing criteria for extending trust to 
experts depending on what you are trying to do. This section explains how the argumentation 
approach is distinctive in that its framework for analyzing and evaluating arguments rests on an 
approach of critically questioning experts rather than trusting them. Argument from expert 
opinion has long been included in logic textbooks under the heading of the fallacy of appeal to 
authority, and even though this traditional approach of so strongly mistrusting authority has 
changed, generally the argumentation approach stresses the value of critical questioning. For 
example, if you are receiving advice from your doctor concerning a treatment that has been 
recommended, it is advocated that you should try not only to absorb the information she is 
communicating to you, but also try your best to ask intelligent questions about it, and in 
particular to critically question aspects you have doubts or reservations about. This policy is held 
to be consistent with rational principles of informed and intelligent autonomous decision-making 
and critical evidence-based argumentation.  
     Sections 3 and 4 explain certain aspects of defeasible reasoning that are important for 
understanding arguments from expert opinion, and outline three formal computational systems 
for modeling arguments from expert opinion, ASPIC+, DefLog and the Carneades 
Argumentation System. Section 5 reviews and explains the argumentation scheme for argument 
from expert opinion and its matching set of critical questions. 
     Section 6 explains a basic difficulty in using critical questions as tools for argument 
evaluation within formal and computational systems for defeasible argumentation. Section 7 
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explains how the Carneades Argumentation System overcomes this difficulty by distinguishing 
between two kinds of premises of the scheme called assumptions and exceptions. Based on this 
distinction, section 7 shows how the scheme for argument for expert opinion, including 
representing the critical questions as assumptions and exceptions, is modeled in the Carneades 
Argumentation System. Section 8 uses a simple example to show how Carneades has the 
capability for evaluating arguments from expert opinion by taking critical questions and 
counterarguments into account. Following the advice that real examples should be used to test 
any theory, section 9 models some arguments from expert opinion in a real case discussing 
whether a valuable Greek statue (kouros) that appears to be from antiquity is genuine or not. 
Section 10 summarizes the findings and draws some conclusions. 
 
2. Arguments from Expert Opinion 
 
     Argument from expert opinion has always been a form of reasoning that is on a razor’s edge. 
We often have to rely on it, but we also need to recognize that we can go badly wrong with it. 
Argument from expert opinion was traditionally taken to be a fallacious form of argument 
coming under the heading of appeal to authority in the logic textbooks. But research in studies on 
argumentation tended to show by an examination of many examples of argument from expert 
opinion that many of these arguments were not fallacious, and in fact they were reasonable but 
defeasible forms of argumentation. At one time, in a more positivistic era, it was accepted that 
argument from expert opinion is a subjective source of evidence or testimony that should always 
yield to empirical knowledge of the facts. However, it seems to be more generally acknowledged 
now that we do have to rely on experts, such as scientists, physicians, financial experts and so 
forth, and that such sources of evidence should be given at least some weight in deciding what to 
do or what to believe in practical matters. Thus the problem was posed of how to differentiate 
between the reasonable cases of argument from expert opinion and the fallacious instances of 
this type of argument. This problem has turned out to be a wicked one, and it has become more 
evident in recent years that solving it is a significant task with many practical applications. 
     The way towards a solution proposed in (Walton, 1997) was to formulate an argumentation 
scheme for argument from expert opinion along with a set of critical questions matching this 
scheme. The scheme and critical questions can be used in a number of ways to evaluate a given 
instance of argument from expert opinion. The scheme requires this type of argument to have 
certain premises articulated as special components of the scheme, and if the argument in question 
fails to have one or more of these premises, or otherwise does not fit the requirements of the 
scheme, then the argument can be analyzed, and even criticized on this basis. The missing 
premise might be merely an unstated premise or an incomplete argument of the kind traditionally 
called an enthymeme. Or in another more problematic kind of case, the expert source might not 
be named. This failure is in fact one of the most common problems with appeals to expert 
opinion found in everyday conversational arguments, such as political arguments and arguments 
put forward in newsmagazines. One premise of the given argument is that an expert says such 
and such, or experts say such and such, without the expert being named, or the group of experts 
being identified with any institution or source that can be tracked down. In other instances, the 
error is more serious, as suggested by the fallacy literature (Hamblin, 1970). In some instances 
fallacies are simply errors, for example the error to name a source properly. However in other 
instances fallacies are much more serious, and can be identified with strategic errors that exploit 
common heuristics sometimes used to deceive an opponent in argumentation (Walton, 2010). 
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Fallacies have been identified by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) as violations of the rules 
of a type of communicative argumentation structure called a critical discussion. Such implicit 
Gricean conversational rules require that participants in an argumentative exchange should 
cooperate by making their contributions to the exchange in a way that helps to move the 
argumentation forward (Grice, 1975). There is an element of trust presupposed by all parties in 
such a cooperative exchange. 
     Some might say that the problem is when to trust experts, and suggest that arguments from 
expert opinion become fallacious when the expert violates our trust in someone. Trust has 
become very important in distributed computational systems: a distributed system is a 
decentralized network consisting of a collection of autonomous computers that communicate 
with each other by exchanging messages (Li and Singhal, 2007, 45). Trust management systems 
aid automated multiagent communications systems that put security policies in place that allow 
actions or messages from an unknown agent if that agent can furnish accredited credentials. 
     Haynes et al., (2013) reported data from interviews in which Australian civil servants, 
ministers and ministerial advisors tried to find and evaluate researchers with whom they wished 
to consult. The search was described as one of finding trustworthy experts, and for this reason it 
might easily be thought that the attributes found to be best for this purpose would have 
implications for studying the argument from expert opinion of the kind often featured in logic 
textbooks. In the study by Haynes et al. (2013,1) evaluating three factors was seen as key to 
reaching a determination of trustworthiness: (1) competence (described as “an exemplary 
academic reputation complemented by pragmatism, understanding of government processes, and 
effective collaboration and communication skills”; (2) integrity (described as “independence, 
authenticity, and faithful reporting of research”); and (3) benevolence (described as 
“commitment to the policy reform agenda”). The aim of this study was to facilitate political 
policy discussions by locating suitable trustworthy experts who could be brought in to provide 
the factual data needed to make such discussions intelligent and informed. 
     Hence there are many areas where it is important to use criteria for trustworthiness of an 
expert, but this paper takes a different approach of working towards developing and improving 
arguments based on an appeal to expert opinion.  This paper takes an argumentation approach, 
motivated by the need to teach students informal logic skills by helping them to be able to apply 
argumentation tools for the identification, analysis and evaluation of arguments. Argument from 
expert opinion has long been covered in logic textbooks, mainly in the section on informal 
fallacies in such a book, where the student is tutored on how to take a critical approach. A critical 
approach requires asking the right questions when the arguer is a layperson who is confronted by 
an argument that relies on expert opinion.  
     Goldman (2001, 85) frames the problem to be discussed as one of evaluating the testimony of 
experts to “decide which of two or more rival experts is most credible”. Goldman defines 
expertise in terms of authority, and defines the notion of authority as follows: “Person A is an 
authority in subject S if and only if A knows more propositions in S, or has a higher degree of 
knowledge of propositions in S, than almost anybody else (Goldman, 1999, 268). This doesn’t 
seem to be a very helpful definition of the notion of an expert, because it implies the 
consequence that if you have two experts, and one knows more than the other, then the second 
can’t be an expert. The good thing about the definition is that it defines expertise in a subject, in 
relation to the knowledge that the person who is claimed to be an expert as in that subject. But a 
dubious aspect of it from an argumentation point of view is that it differentiates between experts 
and nonexperts on the basis of the number of propositions known by the person who is claimed 
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to be an expert, resting on a numerical comparison. Another questionable aspect of the definition 
is that it appears to include being an authority under the more general category of being an 
expert. This is backwards from an argumentation point of view, where it is important to clearly 
distinguish between the more general notion of an authority and the subsumed notion of an 
expert (Walton, 1997). 
     In a compelling and influential book, Freedman (2010) argued that experts, including 
scientific experts, are generally wrong with respect to claims that they make. Freedman 
supported his conclusions with many well documented instances where expert opinion were 
wrong. He concluded that approximately two thirds of the research findings published in leading 
medical journals turned out to be wrong (Freedman, 2010, 6). In an appendix to the book (231-
238), he presented a number of interesting examples of wrong expert opinions. These include 
arguments from expert opinion in fields as widely ranging as physics, economics, sports, and 
child-raising. Freedman went so far as to write (6) that he could fill his entire book, and several 
more, with examples of pronouncements of experts that turned out to be incorrect. His general 
conclusion is worth quoting: “The fact is, expert wisdom usually turns out to be at best highly 
contested and ephemeral, and at worst flat-out wrong” (Freedman, 2010). The implications of 
Freedman’s reports of such findings are highly significant for argumentation studies on the 
argument from expert opinion as a defeasible form of reasoning. 
     Mizrahi (2013) argues that arguments from expert opinion are inherently weak, in the sense 
that even if the premises are true, they provide either weak support or no support at all for the 
conclusion. He takes the view that the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion 
is best represented by its simplest form, ‘Expert E says that A, therefore A’. To support his claim 
he cites a body of empirical evidence showing that experts are only slightly more accurate than 
chance (2013, 58), and are therefore wrong more often than one might expect (63). He even goes 
so far as to claim (58) that “we do argue fallaciously when we argue that [proposition] p on the 
ground that an expert says that p”. He refuses to countenance the possibility that other premises 
of the form of the argument from expert opinion need to be taken into account.  
     From an argumentation point of view, this approach does not provide a solution to the 
problem, because from that point of view what is most vital is to critically question the argument 
from expert opinion that one has been confronted with, rather than deciding to go along with the 
argument or not on the basis of whether to trust the expert or not. One could say that from an 
argumentation point of view of the kind associated with the study of fallacies, it is part of one’s 
starting point to generally be somewhat critical about arguments from expert opinion, in order to 
ask the right questions needed to properly evaluate the argument as strong or weak. Nevertheless, 
as will be shown below, trust is partly involved in this critical endeavour, and Freedman’s 
findings about expert opinions being shown to be wrong in so many instances are important. 
          One purpose of this paper is to teach students informal logic skills using argumentation 
tools. Another purpose is to show that the work is of value to researchers in artificial intelligence 
who are interested in building systems that can perform automated reasoning using 
computational argumentation. Argumentation is helpful to computing because it provides 
concepts and methods used to build software tools for designing, implementing and analyzing 
sophisticated forms of reasoning and interaction among rational agents. Recent successes include 
argumentation-based models of evidential relations and legal processes of examination and 
evaluation of evidence. Argument mapping has proved to be a useful for designing better 
products and services and for improving the quality of communication in social media by making 
deliberation dialogues more efficient. Throughout many of its areas, artificial intelligence has 
5 
 
seen a prolific growth in uses of argumentation, including agent system negotiation protocols, 
argumentation-based models of evidential reasoning in law, design and implementation of 
protocols for multi-agent action and communication, the application of theories of argument and 
rhetoric in natural language processing, and the use of argument-based structures for autonomous 
reasoning in artificial intelligence. 
     The way forward advocated in the present paper is to use formal computational argumentation 
systems that (1) can apply argumentation schemes (2) that are to be used along with argument 
diagramming tools (3) that distinguish between Pollock-style rebutters and undercutters (Pollock, 
1995). On this approach, the problem is reframed as one of how laypersons should evaluate the 
testimony of experts based on an analysis or examination of the argument from expert opinion 
and probe into it by distinguishing different factors that call for critical questions to be asked. On 
this approach, a distinction is drawn between the expertise critical question and the reliability 
critical question. Credibility could ambiguously refer to either one of these factors or both. 
     From an argumentation point of view, dealing with the traditional informal fallacy of the 
argumentum ad verecundiam (literally, argument from modesty) requires carefully examining 
lots of examples of this type of strategic maneuvering for the purpose of deception. This project 
was carried forward in (Walton, 1997) and brought out common elements in some of the most 
serious instances of the fallacy. In such cases it was found that it is hard for a layperson in a field 
of knowledge to critically question an expert, or the opinion of an expert brought forward by a 
third party, because we normally tend to defer to experts. To some extent this is reasonable. For 
example in law, where expert witnesses are given special privileges to express opinions and draw 
inferences in ways stronger than a nonexpert witness is allowed to. In other instances, however, 
because an expert is treated as an authority, and since as we know from psychological studies 
there is a halo effect surrounding the pronouncements of an authority, we tend to give too much 
credit to the expert opinion and are reluctant to critically question it. It may be hard, or even 
appear inappropriate, for a questioner to raise doubts about an opinion that is privy to experts in 
the field of knowledge if one is not oneself an expert in this field. Thus the clever sophist can 
easily appeal to argument from expert opinion in a forceful way that takes advantage of our 
deference to experts by making anyone who questions the expert appear to be presumptuous, and 
to be on dubious grounds. In this paper, however the view is defended that argument from expert 
opinion should be regarded as an essentially defeasible form of argument that should always be 
open to critical questioning.  
 
3. Formal Computational Systems for Modeling Arguments from Expert Opinion 
 
     There are formal argumentation systems that have been computationally implemented that 
can be used to model arguments from expert opinion and to evaluate them when they are nested 
within related arguments in a larger body of evidence (Prakken, 2011). The most important 
properties of these systems for our purposes here are that they represent argument from expert 
opinion as a form of argument that is inherently defeasible, and they formally model the 
conditions under which such an argument can be either supported or defeated by the related 
arguments in a case. 
     One such system is ASPIC+ (Prakken, 2010). It is built on a logical language containing a set 
of strict inference rules as well as a set of defeasible inference rules. Although it would normally 
model argument from expert opinion as a defeasible form of argument, it also has the capability 
of modeling it as a deductively valid form of argument, should this be required in some 
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instances, for example when a knowledge base is assumed to be closed. ASPIC+ is based on a 
Dung-style abstract argumentation framework that determines the success of argument attacks 
and that compares conflicts in arguments at the points where they conflict (Dung, 1995). 
ASPIC+ is built around the notion of defeasibility attributed to (Pollock, 1995). Pollock drew a 
distinction between two kinds of refutations he called rebutting defeaters, or rebutters, and 
undercutting defeaters, or undercutters (Pollock, 1995, 40). A rebutter gives a reason for denying 
a claim. We could say, to use different language, that it refutes the claim by showing it is false. 
An undercutter casts doubt on whether the claim holds by attacking the inferential link between 
the claim and the reason supporting it. 
     Pollock used a famous example (1995, 41) to illustrate his distinction. In this example, if I see 
an object that looks red to me, that is a reason for my thinking it is red. But suppose I know that 
the object is illuminated by a red light. This new information works as an undercutter in 
Pollock’s sense, because red objects look red in red light too. It does not defeat (rebut, in 
Pollock’s sense of the term) the claim that the object is red, because it might be red for all I 
know. In his terminology, it undercuts the argument that it is red. We could say that an 
undercutter acts like a critical question that casts an argument into doubt rather than strongly 
refuting it.  
     The logical system DefLog (Verheij, 2003, 2005) has been computationally implemented and 
has an accompanying argument diagramming tool called ArguMed that can be used to analyze 
and evaluate defeasible argumentation. ArguMed is available free on the Internet: 
(http://www.ai.rug.nl/~verheij/aaa/argumed3.htm) and it can be used to model arguments from 
expert opinion. The logical system is built around two connectives called primitive implication, 
represented by the symbol ~> and dialectical negation, represented by X. 
     There is only one rule of inference supported by primitive implication. It is the rule often 
called modus non excipiens by Verheij (2003) but more widely called defeasible modus ponens 
(DMP). 
 
     A ~> B 
     A 
     Therefore B 
 
The propositions in DefLog are assumptions that can either be positively evaluated as justified, 
or negatively evaluated as defeated. The system may be contrasted with that of deductive logic in 
which propositions are said to be true or false, and there is no way to challenge the validity of an 
inference. The only ways to challenge a deductively valid argument is to attack one of its 
premises or pose a counterargument showing that the conclusion is false. No undercutting, in 
Pollock’s sense, is allowed. 
     To see how primitive implication works, consider Pollock’s red light example. Verheij (2003, 
324) represents this example in DefLog by taking the conditional ‘If an object looks red, it is 
red’, as a primitive implication. The reasoning in the first stage of Pollock’s example where the 
observer sees the object is red, and therefore concludes that it is red, is modeled in DefLog as the 
following DMP argument. 
 
     looks_red 
     looks_red ~> is_red 
     Therefore is_red 
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The reasoning in the second stage of Pollock's example is modeled as follows. 
 
     looks_red 
     illuminated by a red light 
     looks_red ~> X(looks_red ~> is_red) 
     Therefore X(is_red) 
 
The third premise is a nested defeasible primitive implication containing a defeasible negation. It 
states that if the object looks red under the circumstances of its being illuminated by red light it 
cannot be inferred that it is red simply because it looks red. The conclusion is that it cannot be 
concluded from the three premises of the argument that the object is red. Of course it might be 
red, but that is not a justifiable reason for accepting the conclusion that it is red.  
     How the red light argument above is visually represented in Verheij’s argument diagramming 
system ArguMed can be shown using figure 1. 
 
        
The object I see is red.
I see an object that looks red.
If an object looks red then (defeasibly) it is red.
The object I see is illuminated by a red light.
If the object I see is illuminated by a red light, then the statement 
(if an object looks red then (defeasibly) it is red)) is defeated. 
 
 
                    Figure 1: Pollock’s Red Light Example Modeled in DefLog 
 
The first stage of the reasoning in Pollock’s example is shown by the argument at the bottom of 
figure 1. It has two premises, and these premises go together in a linked argument format to 
support the conclusion that the object I see is red. Above these two premises we see the 
undercutting argument, which itself has two premises forming a second linked argument. This 
second linked argument undercuts the first one, as shown by the line from the second argument 
to the X appearing on the line leading from the first argument to the conclusion. So the top 
argument is shown as undercutting the bottom argument, in a way that visually displays the two 
stages of the reasoning in Pollock’s example. 
    Next it is shown how an argument from expert opinion is modeled as a defeasible argument in 
DefLog by displaying a simple example in figure 2. The argumentation scheme on which the 
argument represented in figure 2 is based will be presented in section 5 below. even though this 
form does not yet been stated explicitly the reader can easily see at this point that in the example 
shown in figure 2 a particular form of argument from expert opinion is being used. 
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Pluto is not a planet.
Pluto’s being a planet is within the domain of astronomy.
Bob is not trustworthy.
Bob says that Pluto is not a planet.
Bob is an expert in astronomy.
 
 
      Figure 2: Argument from Expert Opinion as a Defeasible Argument in DefLog 
 
In this example the argument from expert opinion is shown with its three premises in the top part 
of figure 2. The proposition at the bottom, the statement that Bob is not trustworthy, corresponds 
to one of the critical questions matching this scheme for argument from expert opinion. Let’s say 
that when a critic puts forward this statement, it undercuts the argument from expert opinion 
based on Bob’s being an expert in astronomy. The reason is that if Bob is not trustworthy, a 
doubt is raised on whether we should accept the argument based on his testimony. More will be 
shown about how to model trustworthiness in another system below. 
      
4. The Carneades Argumentation System 
 
     Carneades is a formal and computational system (Gordon, 2010) that also has a visualization 
tool that is available at http://carneades.github.com. The Carneades Argumentation System 
(CAS) formally models argumentation as a graph, a structure made up of nodes that represent 
premises or conclusions of an argument, and arrows representing arguments joining points to 
other points (Gordon, 2010). An argument evaluation structure is defined in CAS as a tuple 
〈state, audience, standard〉, where a proof standard is a function mapping tuples of the form 
〈issue, state, audience〉 to the Boolean values true and false, where an issue is a proposition to be 
proved or disproved in L, a state is a point the sequence of argumentation is in, and an audience 
is the respondent to whom the argument was directed in a dialogue. The audience determines 
whether a premise has been accepted or not, and argumentation schemes determine where the 
conclusion of an argument should be accepted given the status of its premises (accepted, not 
accepted or rejected). A proposition in an argument evaluation  structure is acceptable if and only 
if it meets its standard of proof when put forward at a particular state according to the evaluation 
placed on it by the audience (Gordon and Walton, 2009).  
     Four standards were formally modeled in CAS (Gordon and Walton, 2009). They range in 
order of strictness from the weakest shown at the top to the highest shown at the bottom.  
 
The Scintilla of Evidence Standard 
• There is at least one applicable argument.  
The Preponderance of Evidence Standard 
• The scintilla of evidence standard is satisfied, and 
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• the maximum weight assigned to an applicable pro argument is greater than the 
maximum weight of an applicable con argument. 
The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard 
• The preponderance of evidence standard is satisfied,  
• the maximum weight of applicable pro arguments exceeds some threshold α, and  
• the difference between the maximum weight of the applicable pro arguments and 
the maximum weight of the applicable con arguments exceeds some threshold β. 
The Beyond Reasonable Doubt Standard 
• The clear and convincing evidence standard is satisfied and  
• the maximum weight of the applicable con arguments is less than some threshold 
γ. 
 
The threshold γ is not given a fixed numerical value. It is left open to be specified by the 
contextual application and is meant to be specified by the user. 
     The visualization tool for the CAS is still under development. The argument map drawn with 
CAS shown in figure 3 indicates how a typical argument diagram appears to the user in the most 
recent version (1.0.2). The statements making up the premises and conclusions in the argument 
are inserted in a menu at the left of the screen, and then they appear in an argument diagram of 
the kind displayedin figure 3. The default standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence, but 
that can be changed in the menu. The user inputs which statements are accepted or rejected (or 
are undecided), and then CAS draws inferences from these premises to determine which 
conclusions need to be accepted or rejected (or to be declared undecided). 
 
 
 
                   Figure 3: An Example Argument Visualized with Carneades 
 
     In the example shown in figure 3, the ultimate conclusion, the statement that the Getty kouros 
is genuine, appears at the left. Supporting it is a pro argument from expert opinion with three 
premises. The bottom premise is attacked by a con argument. The two premises of the con 
argument are shown as accepted, indicated by the light gray background in both text boxes and a 
checkmark in front of each statement in each text box. The con argument is successful in 
defeating the bottom premise of the pro-argument, and hence the bottom premise is shown in a 
darker text box with an X in front of the statement and the text box. This notation indicates that 
the statement in the text box is rejected. Because of the failure of one premise of the argument 
from expert opinion, the node with the plus sign in it is shown with a white background, 
indicating the argument is not applicable. Because of this the conclusion is also shown in a white 
text box, indicating that it is stated but not accepted (undecided). In short, the original argument 
is shown as refuted because of the attack on the one premise. 
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     CAS can also use argumentation schemes to model defeasible arguments such as argument 
from expert opinion, argument from testimony, argument from cause and effect, and so forth. If 
the scheme fits the argument chosen to be modeled, the scheme is judged to be applicable to the 
argument and the argument is taken to be “valid” (defeasibly). 
 
     
Pluto is not a planet.
Bob says that Pluto is not a planet.
Bob is an expert in astronomy.
Pluto’s being a planet is within the domain of astronomy.
Bob is not trustworthy.
+EX
 
 
                        Figure 4: Carneades Version of the Pluto Example 
 
The name of the argumentation scheme in figure 4 is indicated in the node joining the three 
premises to the ultimate conclusion. EX stands for the argument from expert opinion, and the 
plus sign in the node indicates that the argument from expert opinion is used as a pro-argument. 
The statement ‘Bob is not trustworthy’ is the only premise in a con argument, indicated by the 
minus sign in the node leading to the node containing the argument from expert opinion. This 
con argument is modeled by CAS as a Pollock-style undercutter.  ASPIC+, DefLog and CAS all 
use undercutters and rebutters to model defeasible argumentation, but the way that CAS does this 
in the case of argument from expert opinion is especially distinctive. This will be explained using 
an example in section 7.  
 
5. The Scheme and Matching Critical Questions 
 
     There can be different ways of formulating the argumentation scheme for argument from 
expert opinion. The first formulation of the logical structure of this form of argument was given 
in Walton (1989, 193), where A is a proposition. 
 
E is an expert in domain D. 
E asserts that A is known to be true.  
A is within D. 
Therefore, A may plausibly be taken to be true. 
 
Matching the original version of this scheme six critical questions were informally presented 
(Walton, 1989, 194-196). The first is whether the opinion put forward by the expert falls within 
his or her field of competence. The second is whether the source cited as an expert is really an 
expert, as opposed to being a source that was cited on grounds of popularity or celebrity status. 
The third is the question of how authoritative the expert should be taken to be. The fourth is 
whether there are other experts who disagree. The fifth is whether the expert’s opinion is 
consistent with any objective evidence that may be available. The sixth is whether the 
pronouncement made by the expert has been correctly interpreted. 
11 
 
    A more recent version of the scheme for argument from expert opinion was given (Walton, 
Reed and Macagno, 2008, 310) as follows. This version of the scheme is closely comparable to 
the one given in (Walton, 1997, 210). 
     Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A. 
     Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A is true (false). 
     Conclusion: A is true (false). 
The difference between this scheme and the earlier one is that the assumption that the 
proposition A is within the domain D is stated as a separate premise in the original version, 
whereas in the later version it is included as part of the major premise.  
     It has also been noted that the scheme can be formulated in a conditional version that makes it 
have the structure of defeasible modus ponens (DMP) in DefLog. This conditional version can 
be formulated as follows (Reed and Walton, 2003, 201). 
     Conditional Premise: If Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A, 
     and E asserts that proposition A is true (false) then A is true (false). 
     Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A  
     Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A is true (false). 
     Conclusion: A is true (false). 
Part of Mizrahi’s argument (2013, 68) is that the conditional premise in the expanded version of 
the scheme for argument from expert opinion is “implausible” because it makes the claim that 
the fact that an expert says that proposition P makes it significantly more likely that P is true. 
However, he holds this opinion because, like Goldman, he takes the traditional view that such a 
conditional can only be deductive in nature, like the strict material conditional of classical 
deductive logic, or an inductive conditional that is statistical in nature. Carneades offers a third 
possibility by admitting a form of modus ponens that is defeasible but not inductive in nature.  
     On this view the conditional version of the scheme has the following logical structure, where 
P1, P2 and P3 are meta-variables for the premises in the scheme and C is a meta-variable for the 
conclusion. 
     If P1, P2 and P3 then C 
     P1, P2 and P3 
     Therefore C 
It is important to emphasize that the scheme has to be seen as defeasible in nature when taken as 
an instance of the form of inference DMP. The assumption behind configuring the scheme in this 
defeasible manner is that generally speaking it is not justifiable to take the word of an expert as 
infallible, even though it is also generally reasonable to presume what an expert says is right in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary. To accept what an expert says as having to be right 
absolutely, beyond all questioning or possibility of doubt makes that form of argument inherently 
fallacious. Exploiting the tendency of some participants in argumentation to take what an expert 
says as sacrosanct has been identified fallacious form of argument from authority in which an 
arguer tries to get the best of a speech partner unfairly (Walton, 1997). When you are trying to 
decide what to do in a given set of circumstances, or what proposition to accept, you can do 
much better if you tentatively accept what an expert says unless you have reason not to accept it, 
so long as you are prepared to critically question the advice given by the expert. In (Walton, 
1977) it is shown that it is important not to be intimidated by expert opinions because of the 
powerful halo effect of an expert pronouncement. The original critical questions matching the 
original scheme have been reformulated in a more precise way to match the newer version of the 
scheme. This new way of formulating the six basic critical questions (Walton, Reed and 
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Macagno, 2008, 310) has a name for each question. This way of formulating the six basic critical 
questions comes from the earlier version of the scheme given in (Walton, 1997, 223). 
      Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source? 
     Field Question: Is E an expert in the field F that A is in? 
     Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A? 
     Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source? 
     Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert? 
     Backup Evidence Question: Is E’s assertion based on evidence? 
The important factor to stress once again is the defeasible nature of the argument. This defeasible 
aspect is brought out by seeing how the critical questions function as devices for evaluating an 
argument from expert opinion. If a respondent asks any one of the six critical questions, the 
original argument defaults (meaning that the conclusion can no longer be taken to be accepted 
given that the premises are accepted) unless the question is answered adequately. But once the 
question has been answered adequately, the argument tentatively stands until further critical 
questions are asked about it. As more critical questions matching the scheme are answered 
appropriately, the argument from expert opinion gets stronger and stronger, even though it may 
have been weak to begin with. 
 
6. Critical Questioning and Burdens of Proof 
 
     It is important to realize that the six basic critical questions are not the only ones matching the 
scheme for argument from expert opinion. Through research on argument from expert opinion 
and its corresponding fallacies, and through teaching students in courses and informal logic how 
to try to deal intelligently with arguments based on expert opinion, these basic six critical 
questions have been distilled out as the ones best suited to give guidance to students on how to 
critically and intelligently react to arguments from expert opinion. However, each of the basic 
critical questions has critical sub-questions beneath it (Walton, 1997).  
     Under the expertise critical question, there are three sub-questions (Walton 1997, 217). 
1. Is E biased? 
2. Is E honest?  
3. Is E conscientious?  
Classifying and framing such critical questions is a matter of analyzing examples of fallacious 
arguments from expert opinion, to see where these erroneous arguments went wrong (Walton, 
1997). Once the errors were classified in a systematic way, sets of critical questions designed to 
pinpoint and cope with them were also classified.  
     The possibility that critical questions can continually be asked in a dialogue that can go on 
continually between an arguer and a critical questioner poses problems for modeling a scheme 
like argument from expert opinion in a formal and computational argumentation system. Can the 
respondent go on and on forever asking such critical questions? Open-endedness is of course 
characteristic of defeasible arguments. They are nonmonotonic, meaning that new incoming 
information can make them fail in the future even though they hold tentatively for now. But on 
which side should the burden of proof lie on bringing in new evidence? Is merely asking a 
question enough to defeat the argument, or does the question need to be backed up by evidence 
before it has this effect?  
     The defeasible nature of the argument from expert opinion can be brought out even further by 
seeing that evaluating an instance of the argument in any particular case rests on the setting in 
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which there is a dialogue between the proponent of the argument and a respondent, or critical 
questioner. The proponent originally puts forward the argument, and the respondent has the task 
of critically questioning it or putting forward counterarguments. Evaluating whether any 
particular instance of the argument from expert opinion holds or not in a given case depends on 
two factors. One is whether the given argument fits the structure of the scheme for argument 
from expert opinion. But if so, then evaluation depends on what happens in the dialogue, and in 
particular the balance between the moves of the proponent of the respondent. The evaluation of 
the argument depends on pro and contra moves made in the dialogue. It is possible to put this 
point in a different way by expressing it in terms of shifting of the burden of proof. Once a 
question has been asked and answered adequately, a burden of proof shifts back to the questioner 
to ask another question or accept the argument. But there is a general problem about how such a 
shift should be regulated and how arguments from expert opinion should be computationally 
modeled. 
     Chris Reed, when visiting at University of Arizona in 2001, asked a question. Is there any 
way the critical questions matching a scheme could be represented as statements of the kind 
represented on an argument diagram? I replied that I couldn’t figure out a way to do it, because 
some critical questions defeat the argument merely by being asked, while others don’t, unless 
they are backed up by evidence. These observations led to two hypotheses (Walton and Godden, 
2005) about what happens when the respondent asks a critical question: (1) when a critical 
question is asked, the burden shifts to the proponent to answer it and if no answer is given, the 
proponent’s argument should fail, (2) to make the proponent’s argument fail, the respondent 
needs to support the critical question with further argument. 
     Issues such as completeness of a set of critical questions are important from a computational 
perspective since they hold not only for the scheme for argument from expert opinion but for all 
schemes in general. But the question is not an easy one to resolve because context may play a 
role. For example an opinion expressed by an expert witness in court may have to be questioned 
in a different way from the case of an opinion being expressed in informal setting, or one put 
forward as a conclusion in a scientific paper. Wyner (2012) discusses problems of this sort that 
have arisen from attempts to provide formal representations of critical questions. In (Parsons et 
al., 2012) argumentation schemes based on different forms of trust are set out. In particular there 
are schemes for trust from expert opinion and trust from authority. These matters need to be 
explored further. 
 
7. The Carneades Version of the Scheme and Critical Questions 
 
      The problem of having to choose between the two hypotheses led to the following insight 
that became a founding feature of the Carneades Argumentation System: which hypothesis 
should be applied in any given case depends on the argumentation scheme (Walton and Gordon, 
2005).  In other words, the solution proposed was that a different hypothesis should be applied to 
each critical question of the scheme. This solution allows the burden of proof for answering 
critical questions to be assigned to either the proponent or the respondent, on a question by 
question basis for each argumentation scheme (Walton and Gordon, 2011).  
     The solution was essentially to model critical questions as premises of a scheme by expanding 
the premises in the scheme.  The ordinary premises are the minor and major premises of the 
schemes. The assumptions represent critical questions to be answered by the proponent. The 
exceptions represent critical questions to be answered by the respondent. The two latter types of 
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critical questions are modeled as additional premises. On this view whether a premise holds 
depends not only on its type but also the dialectical status of the premise during a sequence of 
dialogue. Shifts of burden take place as the argumentation proceeds in a case where the parties 
take turns making moves. They do not represent what is called burden of persuasion in law, but 
are more like what is called the burden of producing evidence, or what is often called the 
evidential burden in law (Prakken and Sartor, 2009).  
     In the current version of the Carneades (https://github.com/carneades/carneades) there is a 
catalogue of schemes (http://localhost:8080/policymodellingtool/#/schemes). One of the schemes 
in the catalogue is that for argument from expert opinion, shown below. 
  
id: expert-opinion 
strict: false 
direction: pro 
conclusion: A 
premises: 
• Source E is an expert in subject domain S. 
• A is in domain S. 
• E asserts that A is true. 
assumptions: 
• The assertion A is based on evidence. 
exceptions: 
• E is personally unreliable as a source. 
• A is inconsistent with what other experts assert. 
 
The trustworthiness critical question is represented by the statement that E is personally reliable 
as a source, classified as an exception. This means that if the respondent in the dialogue asks 
whether E is personally reliable as a source that can be trusted (the trustworthiness question), the 
proponent’s argument from expert opinion will not be defeated unless the respondent backs up 
her allegation with some evidence. Otherwise the proponent is entitled to respond to the question 
by saying, “Of course the expert is personally reliable, and that holds unless you can provide 
evidence to the contrary”.  
     In contrast, the backup evidence question is treated as an assumption. This means that if the 
respondent asks for backup evidence on which the experts can support her claim, the proponent 
is obliged to provide some evidence of this kind, else the argument from expert opinion fails. We 
reasonably expect experts to base their opinions on evidence, typically scientific evidence of 
some sort, and if this assumption is in doubt, an argument from expert opinion appears to be 
questionable. Once we have classified each critical question matching a scheme in this way, a 
standardized way of managing schemes in computational systems can be implemented. 
 
8. An Example of Argument from Expert Opinion 
 
     To get some idea of how Carneades can model arguments from expert opinion, consider a 
typical case that involves some critical questions. The consistency critical question raises the 
issue of whether, in a case where an argument from expert opinion has been put forward, that 
opinion is consistent with opinions that may have been cited by other experts. The classic case, 
called the battle of the experts, occurs where one expert asserts proposition A and another expert 
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asserts proposition not-A. To make the example more interesting let’s consider a case of this sort 
that also involves the backup evidence question. In the example shown in figure 5, Bob is an 
expert who has asserted proposition A, but Bill is an expert who has asserted proposition not-A. 
The ultimate conclusion of Bob’s argument, namely the proposition A, can be seen at the far left 
of figure 5. As shown at the top, Bob’s argument from expert opinion supports A. One of the 
three ordinary premises of the argument from expert opinion is supported by the proposition that 
Bob gave evidence to support A. This part of the argument diagram shows that the backup 
evidence critical question has been answered, possibly even before it has been raised by a critical 
questioner. Hence this example illustrates what is called a proleptic argument, an argument 
where the proponent responds to an objection even before the objection has been raised by the 
respondent. This strategy is a way of anticipating a criticism. 
 
 
      
 A
Bob is an expert in D.
A is in D.
Bob said that A.
+EX
Bob gave evidence to support A.
Bill is an expert in D.
Bill said that not-A.
A is in D.
-EX
Bill gave evidence to support not-A.
 
 
                                           
                    Figure 5: A Case of the Battle of the Experts Modeled in CAS 
 
     Below the pro argument, there is a con argument from expert opinion, based on what expert 
Bill claimed. Examining both arguments together in figure 5, we can see that it represents a 
classic case of the battle of the experts, of a kind that is well known in legal trials where expert 
witnesses representing both sides are brought forward to offer evidence. 
     How should the argumentation in a case of a deadlock between two arguments from expert 
opinion of this sort be evaluated by CAS? A simplified version of how CAS evaluates such 
arguments can be presented to get some idea of how the procedure works. CAS evaluates 
arguments using a three valued system, in which oppositions can be evaluated as accepted, not 
accepted, or undecided. Here we will simplify this procedure by using a Dung-style labeling 
saying that a proposition is in if it is accepted, and a proposition is out if it is either rejected, not 
accepted or undecided. These initial values of whether a proposition is in or out come from the 
audience. Once the initial values for the propositions are determined by this means, CAS 
calculates, using argumentation schemes and the structure of the argument, whether the 
conclusion is in or out. 
     Let’s reconsider the example shown in figure 5, and say for the purposes of illustration that 
the audience has accepted all the propositions shown in a darkened box as in figure 6. Moreover, 
let’s say that in both instances, the requirements for the argumentation scheme for expert opinion 
have been met, as shown by the two darkened boxes of the nodes containing the notation EX. If 
we were only to consider Bob’s pro-argument shown at the top of figure 6, on this basis the text 
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box containing the proposition A would be darkened showing that the argument from expert 
opinion proves the conclusion A. The argument proves the conclusion because it fits the 
requirements for the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion and all three of its 
ordinary premises are accepted. Moreover, one of them is even backed up by the supporting 
evidence given by the expert. But once we take Bill’s con argument into account, the two 
arguments are deadlocked. One cancels the other. 
 
    
 A
Bob is an expert in D.
A is in D.
Bob said that A.
+EX
Bob gave evidence to support A.
Bill is an expert in D.
Bill said that not-A.
A is in D.
-EX
Bill gave evidence to support not-A.
 
                                           
                     Figure 6: Extending the Case by Bringing in the Audience 
 
There are various ways such a deadlock can be dealt with by CAS. One is to utilize the notion of 
standards of proof. Another is to utilize the presumption that the audience has a set of values that 
can be ordered in priority. By combining these two means, or using them separately, one 
argument can be shown to be stronger than another. Both alternatives can be combined. 
     Next, let’s see how the trustworthiness critical question might enter into consideration in the 
case of this sort. If we look at Bill’s con argument shown at the bottom of figure 7, we see that it 
has been undercut by the statement Bill is not trustworthy. This is an instance of a critical 
question that is an exception being modeled as an undercutter. Because the trustworthiness 
question is an exception, it does not defeat the argument it is directed against unless some 
evidence is given to support the allegation. 
 
      
 A
Bob is an expert in D.
A is in D.
Bob said that A.
+EX
Bob gave evidence to support A.
Bill is an expert in D.
Bill denied A.
A is in D.
-EX
Bill is not trustworthy. Bill lied in the past.
 
                                           
             Figure 7: The Trustworthiness Critical Question Modeled as Undercutter 
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As shown in figure 7, the allegation that Bill is not trustworthy is supported by an argument that 
has a premise stating that Bill lied in the past. Because this premise provides a reason to support 
the allegation that Bill is not trustworthy, the asking of the critical question defeats the argument 
from expert opinion in this instance. As shown in figure 7 the argument node containing the con 
argument from expert opinion is shown with a white background. Bill’s argument from expert 
opinion is knocked out of contention, and so Bob’s argument shows that A is now in. 
     This example has been merely a simple one made up for purposes of illustration so the reader 
can get a basic idea of how CAS models arguments, how it visually represents them using 
argument diagrams and how it evaluates them by using the notion of an audience. To get a better 
idea, as always in the field of argumentation studies, it is helpful to examine a real example. 
     
9. The Case of the Getty Kouros 
 
     A kouros is an ancient Greek statue of a standing nude youth, typically standing with its left 
foot forward, arms at his sides, looking straight ahead. The so-called Getty kouros was bought by 
the J. Paul Getty Museum in Malibu California in 1985 for seven million dollars. Although 
originally thought to be authentic, experts have raised many doubts, and the label on the statue in 
the museum reads “Greek, about 530 BC, or modern forgery”. Evidence concerning the 
provenance of the statue is weak. It was bought by the museum from a collector in Geneva who 
claimed he had bought it in 1930 from a Greek dealer. But there was no archaeological data 
tracing the statue to Greece. The documentary history of the statue appeared to be a hoax 
because a letter supposedly from the Swiss collector dated 1952 had a postcode on it that did not 
exist until 1972 (True, 1987). Figure 8 displays the structure of the two arguments from expert 
opinion, and the argument from the provenance evidence.  
 
       
The Getty kouros 
is genuine.
The provenance 
evidence is weak.
There was no archaeological 
evidence tracing the statue 
to Greece.
The documentary 
history of the statue 
appeared to be a hoax.
The letter dated 1952 
had a postcode on it that 
did not exist until 1972.
+EX
Norman Herz said 
the source of the 
stone the statue 
was made of is 
likely to be Thrace.
Herz is an 
expert in 
geology.
Stanley Margolis showed 
that the kouros could not 
have been made by a forger.
Margolis showed that the dolomite 
underwent a process that could only 
have occurred over many centuries.
Margolis is 
an expert in 
geology.
+EX
Margolis showed that the dolomite surface of 
the kouros had undergone a process in which 
the magnesium content had leached out. 
Margolis concluded that that this 
process could only have occurred 
over the course of many centuries.
+EX
The kouros could 
not have been 
made by a forger.
 
 
      Figure 8: First Two Arguments from Expert Opinion in the Getty Kouros Case 
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     As also shown in figure 8, there was some evidence supporting the genuineness of the statue. 
It was made from a kind of marble found in Thrace. Norman Herz, a professor of geology at the 
University of Georgia determined with a 90% probability that the source of the stone the statue 
was carved from was the island of Thasos. Stanley Margolis, a geology professor at the 
University of California at Davis, showed that the dolomite surface of the sculpture had 
undergone a process in which the magnesium content had leached out. He concluded that this 
process could only have occurred over the course of many centuries (Margolis, 1989). He stated 
that for these reasons the statue could not have been duplicated by a forger (Herz and Waelkens, 
1988, 311). 
     CAS can be used to model the structure of these arguments using the standards of proof, the 
notion of audience as a basis for determining which premises of an argument are accepted, 
rejected or undecided and the other tools explained in section 4. We begin by seeing how one 
argument from expert opinion attacks another. Whether the ultimate conclusion should be 
accepted or not depends in CAS on the standard of proof that is to be applied (Gordon, 2010). If 
the preponderance of the evidence standard is applied, the pro arguments for the genuineness of 
the kouros could win. If a higher standard is applied, such as clear and convincing evidence, or 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the pro argument might fail to prove the conclusion. On this view, 
the outcome depends on the standard of proof for the inquiry and on how acceptable the premises 
are to the audience that is to decide whether to accept the premises or not. In this case the 
standard of proof required to establish that the kouros is genuine is high, given the skepticism 
that is always present in such cases on the part of the experts due to the possibility of forgery, 
and the cleverness of forgers exhibited in many comparable cases. The three main bodies of 
evidence required to meet this standard are (1) the geological evidence concerning the source of 
the stone statue is made of, (2) the judgment of experts concerning how close is the match 
between the artistic techniques exhibited in this statue and the comparable techniques exhibited 
in other statutes of the same kind known to be genuine, and (3) the provenance evidence.  
     The case can be extended by introducing some evidence provided by a third expert as shown 
in figure 9. In the 1990s a marine chemist named Miriam Kastner was able to artificially induce 
de-dolomitzation in the laboratory. Moreover, this result was confirmed by previous findings of 
Margolis.1 These results showed that it is possible that the kouros was synthetically aged by a 
forger. This new evidence cast doubt on the claim made by Margolis that this process could only 
occur over the course of many centuries, weakening the argument based on the appeal to the 
expert opinion of Margolis by casting doubt on one of its premises. 
     Modeling the example of the Getty kouros using CAS is useful for demonstrating a type of 
reasoning that the scheme for argument from expert opinion is intended to capture. It shows how 
one argument from expert opinion can be attacked by or supported by other arguments from 
expert opinion. However one subject that we will not deal with in exploring these examples is 
the role of accrual of arguments. We see that the pro argument from expert opinion based on the 
expertise of Herz in geology was supported by the corroborative pro argument from expert 
opinion based on the geological expertise of Margolis. It is implied that the first argument, while 
defeasible, must have had a certain degree of strength or plausibility to begin with, and then 
when the second argument based on the geological evidence came to be taken into consideration, 
the conclusion that the Getty kouros is genuine became even more plausible. But then, when the 
argument from expert opinion put forward by Margolis was attacked by the undermining 
                                                 
1 Michael Kimmelman, Absolutely Real? Absolutely Fake?, New York Times, August 4, 1991, accessed 29/8/2008 
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argument based on an appeal to expert opinion from marine chemistry, the degree of 
acceptability of the conclusion must have gone down. These variations in the strength of the 
body of evidence supporting or attacking the ultimate conclusion that the Getty kouros is genuine 
suggest that some sort of mechanism of accrual of arguments is implicitly at work in how we 
evaluate the strength of support given by the evidence in this case. However it is known that 
accrual is a difficult issue to handle formally (Prakken, 2012). 
     The problem of how to model accrual of arguments by showing how the evidential weight of 
one argument can be raised or lowered by new evidence in the form of another argument that 
corroborates or attacks the first argument has not yet been solved for CAS. But even so, by 
revealing the structure of the group of related argument in the Getty kouros case as shown in 
figure 9, we can still get help in taking the first necessary steps preliminary to evaluating the 
sequence of argumentation by some procedure of accrual of evidence. 
 
        
The Getty kouros 
is genuine.
The provenance 
evidence is weak.
There was no archaeological 
evidence tracing the statue 
to Greece.
The documentary 
history of the statue 
appeared to be a hoax.
The letter dated 1952 
had a postcode on it that 
did not exist until 1972.
+EX
Norman Herz said 
the source of the 
stone the statue 
was made of is 
likely to be Thrace.
Herz is an 
expert in 
geology.
Stanley Margolis showed 
that the kouros could not 
have been made by a forger.
Margolis showed that the dolomite 
underwent a process that could only 
have occurred over many centuries.
Margolis is 
an expert in 
geology.
+EX
Margolis showed that the 
dolomite surface of the kouros 
had undergone a process in 
which the magnesium content 
had leached out. 
Margolis concluded that that this 
process could only have occurred 
over the course of many centuries.
+EX
The kouros could 
not have been 
made by a forger.
Miriam Kastner is an 
expert in marine chemistry.
Kastner artificially induced de-
dolimitization in the laboratory.
It is possible that the kouros was 
synthetically aged by a forger.
+EX
 
 
               Figure 9: Third Argument from Expert Opinion in the Getty Case 
 
     Provenance evidence is especially important as a defeating factor even where the other two 
factors have been established by means of a strong body of supportive evidence. Looking at 
figure 8, it can be seen that the geological evidence is fairly strong, because it is based on the 
concurring opinion of two independent experts. However, given the weakness of the provenance 
evidence, the standard of proof required to establish that the Getty kouros is genuine cannot 
reasonably be met. Also, the situation represented in figure 8 represents a conflict, because the 
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body of evidence under category 1 is conflicted with the body of evidence under category 3. 
What is missing is any consideration of the evidence under category 2. 
     If we were to take into account further evidence not modeled in figure 8, the evaluation of the 
evidential situation might not turn out to be too much different, since there was a recurring 
conflict of opinions on how close the match was between the Getty kouros and other statues of 
the same kind known to be genuine. Once we look at the further evidence shown in figure 9, the 
geological evidence is weakened by the introduction of new evidence concerning Kastner’s 
artificial aging of the stone in the laboratory by de-dolomitization. In figure 9 the new evidence 
based on the argument from expert opinion of Kastner is shown at the bottom of the argument 
diagram. This new argument attacks the conclusion of the Margolis expert opinion argument that 
the kouros could not have been made by a forger. 
     This new evidence brings the geological evidence even further from the possibility of meeting 
the standard of proof required to establish that the Getty kouros is genuine. If other experts 
independent of Margolis were to confirm Kastner’s result, it would make the argument from 
geology stronger. However the fact that it was Margolis who confirmed Kastner’s result is good 
as well, in a certain respect, because he was the original expert who claimed that the statue could 
not have been duplicated by a forger. Now it would seem that he would have to admit that this is 
possible. Although we don’t have any evidence of his reaction, his confirmation of Kastner’s 
result suggests that there is reason to think that he would have reason to retract his earlier claim 
that the statute could not have been duplicated by a forger. 
 
10. Conclusions 
 
     This paper concludes that (1) it is generally a mistake, from the argumentation point of view, 
to trust experts, (2) even though it is often necessary to rely on expert opinion evidence, but that 
(3) we can provisionally accept conclusions drawn from expert opinion on a presumptive basis 
subject to retraction. The paper showed how to evaluate an argument from expert opinion in a 
real case through a five-step procedure that proceeds by (1) identifying the parts of the argument, 
its premises and conclusion, using the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion 
(along with other schemes), (2) evaluating the argument by constructing an argument diagram 
that represents the mass of relevant evidence in the case, (3) taking the critical questions 
matching the scheme into account, (4) doing this by representing them as additional premises 
(assumptions and exceptions) of the scheme and (5) setting in place a system for showing the 
evidential relationships between the pro and con arguments preliminary to weighing the 
arguments both for and against the argument from expert opinion. It was shown that applying 
this procedure in a formal computational argumentation system is made possible by 
reconfiguring the critical questions by distinguishing three kinds of premises in the scheme 
called ordinary premises, assumptions and exceptions. Several examples were given showing 
how to carry out this general procedure, including the real example of the Getty kouros.  
     It was shown in this paper how CAS applies this procedure because it uses a defeasible 
version of the scheme in its argument evaluation system based on acceptability of statements, 
burdens of proof, and proof standards (Gordon, 2010, 145-156). For these reasons CAS fits the 
ESE (epistemology of scientific evidence) model (Walton and Zhang, 2013). This model has 
been applied to the analysis and evaluation of expert testimony as evidence in law. It is 
specifically designed for the avoidance or minimization of error, and like CAS, it is acceptance-
based rather than being based on the veristic view of Goldman. In a veristic epistemology, 
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knowledge deductively implies truth. On this view one agent is more expert than another if its 
knowledge base contains more true propositions than that of the other. The ESE is a flexible 
epistemology for dealing with defeasible reasoning in a setting where knowledge is a set of 
commitments of the scientists in a domain of scientific knowledge that is subject to retraction as 
new evidence comes in. It is not a set of true beliefs, nor is it based exclusively on deductive or 
inductive reasoning (at least the kind represented by standard probability theory).   
     Mizrahi’s argument goes wrong because he uses the single-premised version of the argument 
from expert opinion as his version of the form of the argument in general. This is unfortunate 
because it is precisely when this simple version of the scheme is used to represent argument from 
expert opinion, the other critical questions are not taken into account. The simple version has 
heuristic value because it shows how we often leap from the single premise that somebody is an 
expert to the conclusion that what this person says is true. But the simple version also illustrates 
precisely why leaping to a conclusion in this way without considering the questions of whether 
the person cited is a real expert, whether he or she is an expert in the appropriate field, and so 
forth. It is precisely by overlooking its critical questions, or even worse, ignoring them or 
shielding them off from consideration, that the ad verecundiam fallacy occurs. As shown in this 
paper, argument from expert opinion in its single-premised form, is of no use for argument 
evaluation until the additional premises are taken into account. The single premise version of the 
scheme has initial explanatory value for teaching students  about the simplest essentials of 
arguments from expert opinion, but to get anywhere we need to realize that additional premises 
are involved. This is shown by the model of argument from expert opinion in the CAS. 
     Freedman is open to the criticism of having engaged in a circular form of reasoning because 
he quoted many experts in his book to prove his claim that many experts are wrong. However 
this form of circular reasoning does not commit the fallacy of begging the question, because 
Freedman’s conclusion is based on empirical evidence showing how often experts have been 
wrong, and he is able to interpret this evidence and draw conclusions from it in an informed 
manner. His arguments about errors in expert reasoning, and his findings about why arguments 
from expert opinion reasoning so often go wrong, take place at a meta-level where it is not only 
important but necessary for users of expert opinion evidence to become aware of the errors in 
their own reasoning and correct them, or at least be aware of the weaknesses of them. But he 
does not draw the conclusion that arguments from expert opinion are worthless, and ought to be 
entirely discounted. He went so far in an interview (Experts and Studies: Not Always 
Trustworthy, Time, June 29, 2010) to say that discarding expertise altogether “would be reckless 
and dangerous” and that the key to dealing with arguments from expert opinion is to learn to 
distinguish the better ones from the worse ones. It has been an objective of this paper to find a 
systematic way to use argumentation tools to help accomplish this goal. 
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